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Abstract
The sharing of personal data has the potential to bring sub-
stantial benefits both to individuals and society, but only if
people have confidence that their data will not be used in-
appropriately. As more sensitive data is considered for shar-
ing (e.g., communication records and medical records) and
used to make important decisions, there is a growing need
for transparency in the way that the data is processed, while
protecting the privacy of individuals and the integrity of their
data. We propose a system, VAMS, which allows individu-
als to check accesses to their personal data, and enables au-
ditors to detect violations of policy. Furthermore, our sys-
tem protects the privacy of individuals and organizations,
while allowing published statistics to be publicly verified.
We demonstrate the practicality of our system with two pro-
totypes, based Hyperledger Fabric and Trillian.
1 Introduction
Personal data is playing an increasing role in activities where
there is a high cost of failure, such as health-care, the pre-
vention and detection of crime, and legal proceedings. In
many important situations, the organizations who need ac-
cess to this data are not the ones who generate or hold the
data, so data must be shared in order for it to be effectively
used. Such sharing must however be done with great care
as improper sharing or modification of sensitive data could
result in harm, whether through breaches of confidentiality
or incorrect decisions as a result of tampered data. The harm
from such failures can have wider implications than just the
individuals whose data is involved. If there is widespread
abuse of personal data, people may become unwilling to al-
low their data to be collected and processed even when it
would benefit themselves and society.
Simple restrictions on sharing of personal data can be
automatically enforced through access control and crypto-
graphic protections, such as preventing unauthorized par-
ties from accessing databases in which personal data is held.
However, other equally important restrictions involve human
interpretations of rules or depend on information not avail-
able to the computer system enforcing them. For example,
access to medical records may be permitted only when it
would be in the interests of the patient or access to com-
munication records may be permitted only if it is necessary
and proportionate for the purposes of preventing crime. In
such cases, rules cannot reliably be automatically enforced in
real-time so the approach commonly taken is to keep records
of access attempts and subject the actions to audit. Provided
that the audit can detect improper activities and violations are
harshly punished, abuse can be effectively deterred. Statis-
tics published about the audit can also provide confidence to
society that access to data is being controlled and that orga-
nizations who can access data will be held to account.
This raises questions about who performs the audit and
how the auditor can be assured that the records they see are
accurate. If individuals at risk of their personal data being
misused do not trust that the auditor is faithfully carrying out
their duties then the goal of the audit will not be achieved.
However, because of the sensitivity of personal data and the
records containing the justification for data being processed,
not everyone can act as an auditor. Even if it was possible to
find an organization whose audit would be widely accepted,
an audit based on tampered records would not be reliable.
When actions are taken on the basis of this data, integrity
of the data is also important. Whether making a medical
treatment decision or conducting legal proceedings, relying
on tampered data may lead to severe consequences. It may
be possible to refer back to the organization that collected the
data to verify its integrity, but if that organization no longer
holds the data or has gone out of business, such verification is
not possible. Digital signatures can provide some confidence
that data is genuine, but if the private key is compromised
then any data signed by that key is subject to doubt, even if
it was created before the point of key compromise.
In this paper we propose a system, VAMS, to verify that
audits are performed faithfully and are based on accurate
records of how personal data was accessed, while protect-
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ing the privacy of the individuals and organizations involved.
Furthermore, VAMS allows the integrity of personal data to
be verified and demonstrated, when necessary.
1.1 Motivating scenarios
Although our system is applicable to many settings that in-
volve the sharing of data between parties, we now briefly
introduce two motivating scenarios that are at the origin of
this work, law-enforcement access to communications data
and access to healthcare records.
Law-enforcement access to communications data In the
UK, 95% of serious and organized criminal cases use com-
munications data [32] i.e., metadata temporarily stored by
telecommunications providers and requested by law enforce-
ment. At the time of the request, no external oversight takes
place but information about the request and the justification
for access are stored and made available to an auditor, the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO), which
assesses whether law enforcement make appropriate use of
their powers and publishes a yearly report [34].
Communications data is also used as evidence in legal pro-
ceedings where a senior representative of the telecommuni-
cations provider is asked to verify the evidence in court if
questions are raised about its integrity. Assistance from an
expert witness may be also requested, which is expensive,
time consuming, and impossible if the data has been deleted
between the original request and it being required in court.
Industry standards allow providers to sign or hash commu-
nications data [21], but if the provider’s private key or hash
database is compromised, evidence subsequently presented
will be brought into doubt even if it was generated before the
time of compromise. In this scenario, our system allows the
integrity of evidence to be demonstrated, even if the commu-
nications provider that produced the data no longer exists or
has been compromised. The system will also give assurance
to auditors that records of requests to access communications
data have not been tampered with, and provide assruance that
an auditor’s reported statistics are accurate.
Access to healthcare records In a healthcare system, once
consent has been given by a patient, various parties should
have access to records associated with that patient e.g., their
general practioner should have access to scans from a hospi-
tal and academics running studies should have access to a pa-
tient’s relevant records. Currently, patients can only give per-
mission for broad types of activities and may have concerns
that their information is used inappropriately. Conversely,
patients with serious diseases (e.g., cancer) often have trou-
ble getting the treatment they need, as academics conducting
studies are blocked from contacting them and patients are
unaware that such studies are going on.
Opening up access to medical databases may fulfill the
needs of some patients but it also opens up the potential for
abuse, so it is important for patients to have visibility into
how their data is used.For clinical practice, the default could
be that patients opt in to sharing their data, opting out if
they wish. For academic studies and clinical trials the de-
fault should be that they are opted out, but can opt in. They
can even choose at some granular level which studies they
want to opt in e.g., according to the type of study.
An issue with having patients opt in individually is that
this process may simply not result in a large enough sam-
ple. Equally, patients that are deluged with requests for con-
sent are likely to resort to some default behavior (“click-
through syndrome”) without really understanding what they
have consented to. As such, patients could outsource these
decisions to data brokers i.e., organizations that pay attention
to the studies being conducted and are authorized to provide
consent on behalf of any patients registered with them. Our
system can be applied to allow patients to share their data in
such a way to protect their privacy, while ensuring that unau-
thorized parties are prevented from having access and that
authorized parties abusing their access can be detected.
1.2 Our contributions
We present a system, VAMS, which provides transparency
across the whole timeline of requesting access to data, au-
diting requests and verifying audits. We show that this is
possible by combining existing primitives into a lightweight
overlay that can be applied to many systems.
VAMS uses append-only logs of data access requests, in-
stantiated as either blockchain-based distributed ledgers or
verifiable log-backed maps. The log, whose integrity prop-
erties mean that it can be used as evidence, can be used by
users to find requests relevant to them, and auditors to detect
misuse or errors in requests. Privacy is attained by ensur-
ing that items on the log are unlinkable, and a MultiBallot
scheme based on ThreeBallot and association rule mining al-
lows publicly verifiable and privacy preserving statistics. We
evaluate the performance and security trade-offs of two sam-
ple implementations using Hyperledger Fabric and Trillianas
well as our MultiBallot scheme.
2 Related Work
In this section, we examine existing prior work that relates to
ours. Our system involves auditability (i.e., verifiability) and
privacy requirements, so we focus on work related to this, as
well as systems that have been proposed and are similar to
ours. In particular, we focus on the requirements of our sys-
tem, laid out in more detail in Section 4, which are auditabil-
ity (and more generally, transparency) as well as privacy.
On the privacy side, various works have proposed data
anonymization techniques such as k-anonymity [54], l-
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diversity [40], t-closeness [41] and ρ-uncertainty [10]. How-
ever, as discussed by Domingo-Ferrer and Torra [16] these
techniques provide privacy only when the utility of the
dataset is significantly reduced. Thus, in most cases the
anonymized dataset does not contain enough information to
extract statistically significant insights about the population.
Another line of work that attempts to address this limi-
tation is privacy-preserving association rule mining [3] (we
introduce association rule mining in Section 5). Such tech-
niques generate randomized or perturbed datasets that pro-
tect the privacy of users, while preserving some of the as-
sociations between the variables that are of interest. Orig-
inally, privacy-preserving association rule mining was per-
formed through uniform randomization of the dataset based
on a public factor. As shown by Evfimievski et al. [22]
this naive approach does not protect the users’ privacy effec-
tively. They instead proposed randomization operators [22]
that were also proven ineffective and require a initial dataset
of at least one million records [58]. Zhang et al. proposed
a scheme that considers the existing association rules when
perturbing the data and as a result provides better privacy
bounds [58]. Unfortunately, this scheme has limited ap-
plicability as it severely distorts the strength of the associ-
ation rules, overestimating strong relationships and under-
representing less frequent ones. Overall, the weak privacy
guarantees and the poor accuracy achieved by those schemes
make them unsuitable for our needs.
A more promising line of work is techniques based on dif-
ferential privacy [19]. Such schemes have been studied ex-
tensively in the past years and have been proven to be secure
in a variety of settings [18]. However, they still impose trade
offs between privacy and utility [5], as well as one-shot and
continuous observation [20]. Achieving a meaningful pri-
vacy parameter can also be hard in practice [39], particularly
when the aim is to provide a general solution like ours. This
problem is tackled by Chen et al. [12], who take into con-
sideration the underlying dataset to provide stronger privacy
guarantees and increased utility. However, none of these so-
lutions provide verifiability, thus making it hard for the pub-
lic to verify the integrity of the published data or statistics. In
fact, the analyst who adjusts the noise term may accidentally
or intentionally sample from distributions that drastically
skew the statistics computed [45]. Narayan et al. [45] solve
this problem with a scheme that uses a subset of Fuzz [29] to
generate publicly verifiable validity proofs. Unfortunately,
VerDP has limited expressiveness and severely constrains
the access to the dataset. More specifically, once the pri-
vacy budget of a particular dataset gets depleted, no further
queries or analysis can be conducted. This may exclude re-
searchers from using the data and prevent the application of
novel analysis techniques on older, depleted datasets.
Finally, there are other systems that rely on append only
logs like us. Crosby and Wallach [13] proposed an efficient
construction of a log in the case of a untrusted logger serving
clients storing events in a log kept honest through auditing.
They use a centralized hash-tree based log (which inspired
the one used in Certificate Transparency [38]) but do not ad-
dress secrecy of logged events or replication. Bates et al. [7]
look at accountable logs of wiretapping, which are a specific
example that would not be admissible in some legal systems
e.g., the UK, and are subject to oversight before authoriza-
tion of requests. We consider sharing of data prior to over-
sight, which for example in the case of retained communica-
tions data is more internationally applicable. CONIKS [42]
deals with the specific case of key transparency, allowing
users to monitor their key bindinds, and does not deal with
other problems we address e.g., verifiable audits.
Two papers that are closer to ours are related to showing
compliance with (secret) laws. Goldwasser and Park [26]
propose using append-only ledgers (they give Ethereum as
an example) and zero-knowledge proofs to provide auditabil-
ity for actions related to secret laws. In similar work Fran-
kle et al. [25] propose a system that allows accountability
of secret processes based on multi-party computations and
zero-knowledge proofs. They achieve their goals, but only
in a very specific setting that matches the setup of their pro-
posed hierarchical multi-party computation, and propose that
compliance with the law be embedded in a cryptographic
proof rather than relying on existing auditing infrastructures
and process. Their system does not provide as much trans-
parency as ours, and their reliance on zk-SNARKs requires a
trusted setup. Morevoer, the requirements (e.g., secret laws)
that motivate the use of zero-knowledge techniques are not
generally applicable, as data sharing is usually done accord-
ing to public laws or contracts. Our system is also more
scalable, by not requiring zero-knowledge proofs to be gen-
erated, stored and verified, and easier to deploy.
3 Background
3.1 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) [6] is a modular, open-source sys-
tem for deploying and operating permissioned blockchains
that differs architecturally from other solutions [9, 56]. A
HLF network is composed of peers and an ordering service,
with identities assured by a Membership Service Provider
PKI that maintains a key-value store as the state of the ledger.
The state can be updated and queried through transactions on
the underlying blockchain.
Peers have identities and can be split up into organizations,
as well as roles on the network with regards to transactions.
A transaction requires an endorsing peer (or many) to exe-
cutes deterministic chaincode (i.e., smart contracts) and sign
the transaction containing the resulting state update. Trans-
actions are then sent to the ordering service, which acts as a
consensus mechanism and packages transactions into blocks
that are committed by validating peers, updating the state of
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the ledger accordingly. As only endorsing peers are required
to execute code for a transaction, other peers do not handle
any computational burden other than receiving transactions
and block events from the network. The endorsement mech-
anism also allows for endorsement policies that limit which
peers can invoke, or sign transaction for, a certain chaincode.
3.2 Trillian
Trillian [27] is an open-source project that implements a gen-
eralization of Certificate Transparency (CT) [38], based on a
verifiable log backed by a verifiable map [2].
The verifiable log is an append-only log implemented as a
Merkle tree (as in CT) that allows clients to efficiently verify
that an entry is included in the log with a proof showing the
Merkle path to the tree’s entry, detect log equivocation (i.e.,
conflicting tree heads) and verify that the log is append-only
through Merkle consistency proofs. The verifiable map is a
key-value store implemented as a sparse Merkle tree i.e., a
Merkle tree pre-populated with all possible keys as leaves
e.g., all 2256 possible SHA-256 hashes. Although a tree with
2256 unique leaves would in principle not be practical to com-
pute, only the non-empty leaves have to be computed as all
others will have the same value (e.g., zero) [37]. Clients can
then verify that a certain value is included (or not) in the map
at any point in time, with proofs containing Merkle paths.
Combining a verifiable log with a verifiable map leads to a
verifiable log-backed map, where the log contains an ordered
set of operations applied to the map. Clients can then verify
that the entries in the map they view are the same as those
viewed by others auditing (i.e., replaying) the log, allowing
clients to trust the key-value pairs returned by the map.
Trillian includes three components: the log of entries, the
map and the log of map heads. As it is more centralized, it
does not require a form of consensus like distributed ledgers,
relying instead on gossip between clients and auditors to de-
tect misbehaving servers by comparing the views of the log
they have received. If they detect different views, a crypto-
graphic proof that the server has equivocated exists as every
tree head (the root hash of the Merkle tree of log entries) is
signed by the server and published to a verifiable log.
3.3 ThreeBallot voting system
ThreeBallot [50, 51] is a paper-based voting scheme pro-
posed by Rivest for end-to-end auditable elections. Voters
are given three blank ballots arranged as three columns, each
row corresponding to a single candidate. Marking two of the
three columns in a row is a vote for a candidate, while mark-
ing only one of the columns is a non-vote. In the standard
version of ThreeBallot, each row must have either one or
two marks and blank rows or rows with three marks are not
allowed. After the voting process, the collection of all bal-
lots is placed on a public bulletin board, so that anyone can
Figure 1: All essential parties in our setting and their func-
tionalities, along with the external regulator and their policy.
The optional data broker would act as a user.
verify the outcome of the elections and check if their vote
was represented correctly (while keeping their vote private).
We use ThreeBallot as the starting point for our MultiBal-
lot scheme, presented in Section 5 and Appendix A, which
allows us to obtain a privacy preserving dataset that can be
used to verify statistics.
4 Setting and Threat Model
4.1 Setting and notation
Our proposed system is composed of agents, data providers,
users, auditors, log servers and optional data brokers. Exter-
nal to the system are also regulators that are not active in the
system but define regulations (e.g., the Investigatory Powers
Act of 2016) that determine the rules obeyed by the parties
in the system. Below is a description of the system’s par-
ties, functionalities and malicious behaviors, which are also
summarised in Table 1.
Agents are parties that request access to user data from
data providers (request) e.g., law enforcement and medical
researchers. A malicious agent’s aim would be to access the
data without it being logged or to submit an invalid request.
Data providers are parties that collect user data and that
receive data requests from agents(provide) e.g., telecommu-
nications providers and healthcare providers. A malicious
data provider’s aim would be to give access to the data with-
out it being logged.
Log servers are responsible for providing access to the log
of requests made by agents (host). A malicious log server’s
aim would be to give inconsistent views of the log to auditors
and users.
Auditors are parties that audit data access requests (audit)
and publish statistical reports (publish) e.g., the IPCO. They
must also be able to detect if log servers are behaving dishon-
estly (detect). A malicious auditor’s aim would be to publish
an inaccurate report.
Users are members of the public that wish to check the
requests that have been made about them (check) or that the
reports published by the auditor are correct (monitor). They
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Table 1: The parties in the system, the functions they perform and their malicious behaviour
Party Function Malicious behaviour
Agent request: append request to a data provider the log Providing an invalid request
Data provider provide: answer a request that is on the log Providing invalid data
detect: detect if log servers are behaving dishonestly
User check: look for relevant log entries Attempting to access requests relevant to other users
monitor: verify the statistics published by auditors Attempting to infer information from the statistics
detect: detect if log servers are behaving dishonestly
Auditor audit: check the log entries for misuse or errors Attempting to infer information from the log
publish: publish statistics about entries on the log Publishing inaccurate statistics
detect: detect if log servers are behaving dishonestly
Log server host: return the log to parties wishing to inspect it Providing inconsistent views of the log
Data broker broker: respond to requests in place of a user according to their preferences Misrepresenting the preferences of the user
must also be able to detect if log servers are behaving dis-
honestly (detect). A malicious user’s aim would be to learn
information about another user through the log e.g., access
requests made about other users, or by inferring information
from published reports.
Data brokers are non-essential intermediaries that users
can rely on to deal with data requests if they are willing
to serve as a data provider e.g., providing data to a medi-
cal study. The data broker can then deal with these requests
(broker) according to pre-set rules from the user e.g., type of
study they are willing to participate in. A malicious broker’s
aim would be to misrepresent the user’s preference, for ex-
ample by accepting requests for a study that the user would
not want to participate in.
The log is a key-value store of, for example, access to data
requests. We call log entries records, that relevant parties
can find on the log by identifying the corresponding keys.
Records are tuples of elements that are, for example, the at-
tributes of a data request (e.g., type, urgency) or answers to a
medical questionnaire. Other information that may be pub-
lished in the log by auditors are datasets and statistics. These
can be simply stored as value in plaintext or, if size is an is-
sue, the value can contain a link to the statistics and dataset
along with a hash to verify their integrity.
We assume that all parties may be malicious according to
the definitions above, with some exceptions. First, we do
not allow malicious agents and data providers to collude, as
they could then simply bypass the system. Second, malicious
servers may attempt to corrupt the system by giving different
parties different views of the log, but as this is detectable by
auditors and users (see Argument 1), we take them to simply
be honest but curious for the rest of this paper. We also take
data brokers to be honest, as a user could easily detect if
they were misrepresented by checking access’ to their data,
or simply receiving notifications for the requests that the data
broker accepts.
4.2 Security goals
We now define our security goals that are centered around
auditability, transparency and privacy guarantees. Users and
auditors should be able to access the information that is rel-
evant to them and verify its integrity, allowing for accurate
audits. Moreover, information about the state of the system
and the actions that take place in it should be visible to all
parties, to allow for the system itself to be evaluated. This
must of course be balanced with the privacy of the parties
involved in the system. We describe each property in more
detail below.
Auditability Our auditability goal is to ensure that each of
these functions can be performed by the relevant parties, re-
turning the correct results. To ensure that parties have the
correct results, they must be able to verify that it is the case
i.e., detect any tampering of the information they access, ei-
ther because they are given an incorrect view of the log by
the log server, or because the information on the log has been
modified. This is handled by detect, check and audit. The
published audits themselves must be auditable i.e., anyone
should be able to verify the accuracy of the statistics pro-
vided by auditors. This is handled by monitor.
Transparency Our transparency goal is an extension of
our auditability goal. While auditability ensures that users
and auditors can access information relevant to themselves,
transparency should ensure that anyone in the system has in-
formation about the state of the system and the actions that
take place in the system. This allows the system itself to be
evaluated, so that if issues arise an argument can be made not
only about the specific issue (e.g., an erroneous record) but
about the system in general (e.g., systematic errors).
This is handled by ensuring that the system reveals all in-
formation that is not strictly required to be confidential i.e.,
everything but (some of) the record’s elements. Information
about the state of the system and the actions that take place
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can then be evaluated. Moreover, audits reveal general infor-
mation about the elements of records, and are publicly veri-
fiable so transparency is handled for the system as a whole.
Privacy Our privacy goal is to ensure that despite our au-
ditability and transparency goals, the privacy of parties in the
system is preserved. This means that although all records
are visible to all parties, the private information they con-
tain should only be visible to the relevant parties, although
general information will be available from published audits.
Although the transparency goal is to maximise the infor-
mation that is available about the system, it does not nec-
essarily conflict with the privacy goal which is to minimise
the information available in the system that relates only to
a specific party. Instead, achieving transparency and privacy
goals in conjunction amounts to ensuring that no information
that isn’t available by design can be inferred, as in the case
of published audits. This reduces the risk of privacy being
compromised through inference attacks as is often the case
in privacy-preserving systems that fail.
5 Our System: VAMS
We now give an overview of the general requirements for
a system aiming to achieve the security goals presented in
the previous section. We define the general mechanisms re-
quired to attain these, and propose how they can be instan-
tiated in practice. In particular, we show that using a com-
bination of existing schemes can provide all the necessaries
functionalities, making our proposed model very realistic.
5.1 System requirements
Looking at the functionalities that the parties in the system
must be able to perform and the potential malicious actions
of our threat model outlined in Table 1, we now lay out a ba-
sic framework that supports the required operations without
trusting other potentially malicious parties.
At the center of the system is the log, maintained by log
servers performing host, which should contain requests sub-
mitted by agents through request, which is maintained by
log servers performing host. As auditors and users should
be able to detect malicious log servers through detect and
detect, the log must allow them to detect any misbehavior
e.g., the log server equivocating, in the form of an incom-
plete log or altered log entries. Malicious log servers should
also not impede the ability of auditors and users to perform
audits, so the system should be resilient to some proportion
of malicious log servers.
Key-value stores are a natural choice for the form of the
log, as records on the log can be tied to unique keys (e.g.,
identifiers). Retrieving records is then made simple for au-
ditors and users performing audit and check respectively, as
single keys and ranges of key can easily be queried . Per-
forming these functions with integrity involves being able
to check that the retrieved records correspond to those orig-
inally submitted by agents when request is performed and
have not been tampered, so we require an append-only log.
The need for an append-only data structure can also be
seen in cases where evidence is required. Examples of this
(introduced in Section 1) are cases where law enforcement
or a healthcare company are required to prove they accessed
data with a valid request without a data provider testifying
this is the case, or where a data provider must prove they
provided data matching the request. In particular, urgent re-
quests are authorized orally, with paperwork only retrospec-
tively authorized, so it is not enough attempt to block invalid
requests. Requests should be signed, so that they can be used
as evidence to assign liability and to hold the relevant par-
ties accountable. This would only work if the evidence pro-
duced is robust so that liability can be properly assigned. Ev-
idence should also exist even if the party that produced it is
no longer active e.g., if a data provider declares bankruptcy,
a public authority is abolished or simply if some servers fail,
are destroyed or act maliciously. Thus, log servers should
not depend solely on the party tied to the evidence.
Once the requests are records in the log, auditors per-
form their audits and publish the resulting statistics through
publish. Users must be able to verify these statistics through
monitor, there must be evidence of the results they publish,
as well as the data necessary to verify their results, without
compromising privacy. Moreover, users should also be able
to check that their data was included in the data used to ob-
tain the published statistics to ensure that auditors have not
simply generated data that fits their statistics.
To summarise, our requirements are as follows. First, a
transparency overlay [11] (e.g., a blockchain or Merkle tree)
is needed to instantiate the log. Second, a mechanism that
allows the log be efficiently queried with integrity and with-
out revealing any link between entries on the log is required
to ensure audits are possible and privacy preserving. Third,
a mechanism to publish the reports of an audit in a way that
they are verifiable and do not reveal any information that was
not already obtainable from the log is required.
5.2 Instantiating VAMS
We now describe how solutions to each of the three require-
ments can be instantiated, and argue that they fulfil the re-
quirements of our security goals. We build VAMS based on
primitives introduced in Section 3, namely an append-only
log (HLF or Trillian) used as a key-value store and a pub-
licly verifiable privacy preserving statistics scheme inspired
by the ThreeBallot voting scheme. We supplement this with
a simple scheme that allows entries on the log to be identi-
fiable by relevant parties and unlinkable to others. Security
arguments are presented in the subsequent subsection.
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Appending to the log When performing request, agents
append requests to the log by assigning a request to a key
in the key-value store. Our auditability goals require that
the requests can then be audited by the parties they pertain to
i.e., users performing check to find requests for their data and
auditors performing audit. Moreover, our privacy goals also
require that the private contents of the requests are not visible
to any other parties, and that information cannot be inferred
about the requests by linking them with other requests, users,
agents or data providers. We also aim to make audits easy,
so the information required by users to check requests should
not rely on other parties e.g., communicating with agents or
data providers to find the requests.
To this end, we opt for the use of straightforward encryp-
tion that only requires information that we can reasonably
assume to be known by agents, data providers and users tied
to a request. Specifically, we assume that agents and data
providers refer to a given user using private agent and data
provider identifiers that we denote ida and iddp, we also as-
sume that these are known to the user. It is then possible
to obtain a common identifiers idc = Enc(ida, iddp‖n), for
example by using AES, where n is a session identifier that
changes deterministically with every request involving the
same pair (ida, iddp). This ensure different requests involving
the same parties are unlinkable, but allows users to check rel-
evant requests without communicating with agents and data
providers, which also reduces the risk of information leak-
ing. The private contents of the requests are then simply en-
crypted under the public keys of the user and auditors.
Because ida and iddp may be short and have low entropy, a
key derivation function (KDF) such as PBKDF2 [43] should
be used to obtain a more resilient ciphertext, with ida being
fed through the KDF before being used as an encryption key.
It is also not unrealistic for many agents and data providers
to provide resilient values ida and iddp to users, for example
long pseudorandom strings or passwords adhering to mod-
ern security guidelines. This would increase the burden of
key management but software like password managers could
be relied on. The German Electronic Identity Card, for ex-
ample, can be used for online authentication and has been
analysed from a cryptographic point of view [14].
Querying the log Once requests are logged, users and au-
ditors can verify that the log servers are not malicious by
performing detect, then perform audit and check as required.
This fulfils part of our auditability goals, which also require
that users and auditors have access to untampered data. Ac-
cessing the key-value store, they can assure themselves that
the information obtained from the log is correct due to the
integrity properties of the log and audit requests. Auditors
perform their task over the entire log, or the subset of the log
that they have not yet audited, but users look only for specific
requests. To do so, they must iterate over possible values of
the session identifier n until no request is found, to determine
Figure 2: Constructing shares in Dpriv from a record in D.
The left side illustrates splitting the elements of the record
into individual shares and the right side illustrates generating
three shares from a record.
the possible requests relevant to them.
If users do not wish to take on this computational bur-
den, they can choose to outsource this role to a data broker.
These parties act as intermediaries between agents and users
that would otherwise perform provide, and also allow users
to act as data providers if they are willing to, for example,
participate in a study. One downside of this is that the data
broker must then be trusted with the private identifier tied to
requests that the user positively answers. However, no other
trust is required as VAMS allows the user to check the ac-
tivity of the broker, which will be logged and be auditable
under the same guarantees as other log entries.
Publishing and verifying audits Auditors are expected to
perform publish, revealing statistics computed as a result of
their audit. An example of what might be published are the
statistics provided by the IPCO in its annual report [34], or
results of a study in the healthcare scenario. Our auditability
goals require that these statistics be verifiable, but for opera-
tional and privacy reasons the original data used to compute
statistics cannot be published. In order to accomplish our
goals, we propose a way of publishing a transformed dataset
that can be used by users performing monitor to verify the
data used to compute the statistics, recompute the statistics
themselves and, in accordance with our privacy goals, cannot
be used for anything else than recomputing statistics.
Our scheme is based the simple idea of generating a
dataset Dpriv of shares from the original dataset D of records,
where each record Ri∈[1,n] is comprised of multiple elements
that may, for example, note the existence or absence of a
particular gene or mutation. In both cases, the only overhead
required is to generate the shares, which is not very costly.
The simplest case is that of univariate statistics, which can
be solved by generating a privacy-preserving dataset Dpriv
by splitting each record into shares, one for each element of
the record as in Figure 2, preventing any inference or infor-
mation leakage from correlations between the shares. Each
share is tagged with the element type and a unique share
identifier idshare =Hash(idc|i) constructed from the common
identifier idc of the user and index i of the share. The auditor
then adds Dpriv to the ledger along with the statistics result-
ing of the analysis. Users can then check the presence of
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their shares in Dpriv, and re-compute the published statistics
from Dpriv to check their validity.
The case of multivariate statistics is a bit more compli-
cated. We introduce a MultiBallot scheme based on Three-
Ballot (introduced in Section 3.3) that can be used to gen-
erate Dpriv, by generating from each record an odd number
n = 2k+ 1 of shares comprised of as many elements as the
original record. The constraint on these shares is that given
an element e in a record, k+ 1 shares then include e and k
shares must include e, the false value for e, as illustrated in
Figure 2. This preserves the accuracy of multivariate statis-
tics, while protecting the privacy of users by making it hard
to reconstruct the original record. Auditors can then publish
Dpriv, so that users can verify that their shares are accurately
represented and that the statistics are correct.
Appendix B shows how the scheme can be applied in the
context of associated rule mining, allowing results of an anal-
ysis of D to be estimated from Dpriv. By generalising the
ThreeBallot scheme to a MultiBallot scheme with n shares
we allow more control of the privacy levels to accommodate
a wider variety of use cases.
5.3 Security of VAMS
We now discuss the security of VAMS with respect to the
goals introduced in Section 4, namely auditability, trans-
parency and privacy.
Auditability Attaining our auditability goal requires that
the relevant parties (i.e., users and auditors) be able to audit
any action in the system that pertains to them. In the case of
VAMS, this means being able to ensure that the view of the
log returned by the log server is correct, that the information
contained on the log is correct and that it is accessible by the
parties it is relevant to, and that the results of an audit can be
verified. We split this into three arguments.
Auditability argument 1 (Detecting log misbehavior). We ar-
gue that an adversary controlling a malicious log server is
detectable i.e., an auditor or user performing detect returns
0. Log server misbehavior corresponds to equivocation.
In the HLF case, either the ordering service maintains con-
sensus, and there is no equivocation, or there is a fork of the
blockchain. In that case, both the main chain and the alter-
native chain are visible, so equivocation can be detected.
In the Trillian case, a log server that equivocates would
have to produce signed tree heads and Merkle consistency
proofs for the alternative Merkle trees. Different Merkle con-
sistency proofs leading from the same Merkle tree generate
different views of the log, but these differing logs can no
longer accept the same Merkle consistency proofs to extend
the logs because the leaves are different. As tree heads are
signed by the log server, two inconsistent tree heads can be
used as evidence to implicate the log server [11, 17].
Auditability argument 2 (Auditability of the log). We now
argue for the auditability of the system for auditors and users
i.e., that the results of an audit is correct with respect to the
view of the log provided by honest log servers.
For auditors, as we assume that data providers do not col-
lude with agents, the log will be complete in terms of the
requests that have been made. By the previous argument, we
can also assume that the auditor’s view of the log server is
correct, otherwise the log server can be implicated and re-
moved from the system. Finally, any attempt to modify in-
formation on the log also appears in the log due to the com-
pleteness properties of both HLF and Trillian.
In the HLF case, we rely on the integrity properties of the
underlying blockchain that records state updates. Auditors
can obtain the available key-value history function to obtain
the transactions that have modified the value of a key. If they
do not trust the integrity of that function (the code for which
is public), they have access to the blockchain and can inspect
it, replaying transactions and detecting a party’s misbehavior
as they will have signed the relevant transactions.
In the Trillian case, we rely on the integrity properties
of the underlying Merkle tree, and the Merkle consistency
proofs that give the append-only property of the tree. In the
event that a malicious party has tried to tamper with requests,
they will have to update a request value, which will appear
in the append-only log. If the log server produces a new tree
head for a tree that modifies requests in the tree associated
with the previous tree head, there cannot be a Merkle con-
sistency proof between the two trees, so it will be detectable.
Similarly, if a leaf of an existing tree is removed, the Merkle
root of the tree will no longer match the leaves.
Auditors can then perform audit by querying the state of
the ledger or log-backed map containing the requests, which
are encrypted under their public keys, and perform their anal-
ysis as required. Requests that cannot be decrypted can sim-
ply be classed as invalid and reported. The same argument
can be used for users performing check.
Auditability argument 3 (Auditability of published audits).
In the case of a user performing monitor, we again have that
the user has a correct and complete view of the log by fol-
lowing through the arguments previously presented.. A mali-
cious auditor could nonetheless perform publish maliciously,
publishing incorrect statistics or the wrong dataset, but this
would be detected by a user performing monitor. A user
that was included in the used dataset D used can check the
integrity of the transformed dataset Dpriv, identifying their
shares to verify their correctness. Once the integrity of the
data is confirmed, any other user can replicate the compu-
tations of the analysis and compare their results with those
published, detecting any false statistics.
Finally, if malicious auditor does not generate shares ran-
domly so that Dpriv might reveal information, users perform-
ing monitor can handle this by checking that the distribution
of shares in Dpriv is as expected.
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Transparency
Transparency argument 1. The argument that VAMS pro-
vides transparency follows from what has already been said
in the auditability argument above. Transparency is achieved
if not only the users and auditors see information pertaining
to themselves, but if they also more generally have infor-
mation about the system and the functions performed in the
system. VAMS achieves this for the following reasons.
First, although the information inside records is encrypted,
records themselves are visible to all parties in the system,
which can be anyone was we do not place any restrictions
on who can be a user. This means that anyone can see the
activity going on in VAMS. Second, although information
in the records is encrypted, audits reveal aggregate informa-
tion about the system as a whole. Moreover, this information
is publicly verifiable due to the availability of Dpriv, which
comes with integrity properties. This means that anyone can
see the overall results of the actions taking place in VAMS.
Privacy
Privacy argument 1 (Privacy of the log). We start by arguing
that the log does not compromise the privacy of the parties
in VAMS. Because confidential information in the records is
encrypted, we focus on the unlinkability of records between
themselves, and to users, agents or data providers. We as-
sume that AES is a secure pseudorandom permutation and
that session identifiers n are used only once for each pair of
private identifiers ida and iddp, and argue it is not possible
to link two or more requests (i.e., common identifiers) that
appear in the log except for the relevant users.
A user or an adversary knowing ida and iddp will be able
to find requests relevant to the user with probability 1 by per-
forming check. In the case of an adversary knowing only one
of ida and iddp, determining the second identifier would re-
quire iterating over the possible values of the unknown iden-
tifier (2b values for a bitstring identifier of length b) and the
range of the session identifier i.e., O(2b · range(n)) encryp-
tion operations. This would reveal only one pair of private
identifiers, giving the adversary only limited information. If
neither ida or iddp are known to the adversary, another factor
of 2b must be taken into account.
Moreover, if the adversary considers two common iden-
tifiers, the security of AES is enough to argue that the ad-
versary will not be able to determine if they shared one or
more inputs with any reasonable probability. In the case of
agent and data provider unlinkability, each pairing is equally
likely. Thus, the probability of correctly determining a pair
is 1|A||DP| , where |A| and |DP| are the size of the sets of agents
and data providers, respectively.
Privacy argument 2 (Privacy of the published audits). We
now argue that published audits i.e., the statistics and the
dataset Dpriv, do not reveal more than the statistics them-
selves. An adversary could have two kinds of information,
Table 2: Number of elements for 3Ballot and 5Ballot such
that the probability of a successful reconstruction is less than
0.01%. The numbers in brackets indicate the adversary’s ad-
vantage (i.e., known shares) and the probability of success.
Scheme 10 users 100 users 1000 users 10 000 users
3Ballot (1) 3 (3 ·10−5) 6 (5 ·10−13) 10 (6 ·10−10) 14 (1 ·10−7)
3Ballot (2) 1 (8 ·10−5) 2 (2 ·10−12) 4 (2 ·10−10) 6 (5 ·10−9)
5Ballot (1) 6 (4 ·10−6) 11 (5 ·10−20) 17 (3 ·10−12) 23 (2 ·10−13)
5Ballot (4) 1 (5 ·10−5) 2 (3 ·10−9) 3 (2 ·10−17) 5 (3 ·10−7)
knowing up to n−1 shares that were generated from a user’s
record or up to e− 1 elements of a user’s record. In both
cases the adversary will take the information they have and
try to determine all of the user’s shares to reconstruct their
record. We consider our scheme to be privacy preserving if
this cannot happen with any reasonable probability.
The case of univariate statistics is straightforward as
shares are split from each other. As long as the hash func-
tion used to tag the shares is pre-image resistant they will be
unlinkable, and the adversary is left to pick shares at random.
The more interesting case is that of multivariate statistics
and our MultiBallot scheme, where shares contain multiple
elements and could therefore be more useful. A successful
attack would amount to being able to reconstruct a user’s
record i.e., identify the shares generated from the record.
Henry et al. [31] previously considered reconstruction at-
tacks on the ThreeBallot scheme, computing the adversary’s
probability of a success given that they have one share.
As we have generalised to the case of any odd number n
of shares, we extend their argument to our case and compute
new bounds on the safe number of elements that can be in-
clude in a share of Dpriv for different values of n, users, and
information (i.e., shares) known to the adversary. These are
computed by calculating the number of possible shares and
the probability of these shares in a MultiBallot scheme, then
calculating the probability that combinations of shares will
be valid and from that the probability of a successful recon-
struction attack. Details and explicit formulas are given in
Appendix A. We present bounds for 3 and 5Ballot in Table 2,
where it is easy to see that increasing the number of shares
per ballot noticeably increases the number of elements that a
record can contain.
Different bounds can be chosen depending on the required
level of privacy i.e., the acceptable probability of a recon-
struction. In practice, only a few elements may be relevant
to the results of an audit or study, and only those need to be
published for the relevant statistics to be publicly verifiable.
Finally, we have assumed statistical independence between
elements, which may not always be true. Fortunately, Three-
Ballot with correlated ballots was studied by Strauss [52]
who showed that even heavily correlated races (elements)
had only a minor effect on the security of the scheme.
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Figure 3: The Hyperledger Fabric based implementation.
6 Implementation and Performance
We now present an evaluation of two implementations
of VAMS, one based on Hyperledger Fabric and one
based on Trillian. Both are evaluated on modest Amazon
AWS t2.medium instances.1 The ThreeBallot-based privacy
scheme is also evaluated. The code for each of these will be
open-sourced after publication.
6.1 Implementations
Hyperledger Fabric implementation Rather than being
an out of the box solution, Hyperledger Fabric (HLF, intro-
duced in Section 3.1) is a modular platform on top of which
systems can be built, making it suitable choice to implement
VAMS. As HLF is under ongoing development by IBM, im-
provements in scalability, privacy and integrity can be ex-
pected, allowing for more potential uses.
We implement a test network as proof of concept, with
seven separate machines that represent four peers (an agent,
a data provider, a user and an auditor), an ordering service
(an Apache Zookeeper service and a Kafka broker), and a
client from which commands are sent to peers. The network
maintains a key-value store that can be populated by requests
linked to common identifiers. These requests can then eas-
ily be retrieved by querying specific keys or a range of keys
in lexical order. A key history function is also available.
State updates correspond to transactions on the underlying
blockchain, making them verifiable.
For this simplified implementation, all peers are connected
to the same channel and there is a single chaincode contain-
ing four functions. The first is used to update the state of
the ledger (as part of request), the second is used to retrieve
a range of key values (as part of audit), the third is used to
retrieve values for specific keys (as part of check) and the
fourth is used to retrieve a key’s history (as part of audit
and check) to see which blockchain transaction resulted in
state updates for a given key. The transactions that result in
state updates of the log (i.e., changing the value of a key)
1Each instance has 2 vCPUs, 4GB of memory and is running Linux
16.04 LTS with Go 1.7, docker-ce 17.06, docker-compose 1.18 and Fabric
1.06 installed.
Figure 4: The Trillian based implementation.
correspond to chaincode invocations, which are recorded on
the underlying blockchain. Chaincode invocations that only
query the log (i.e., do not update the value of a key) are also
recorded.
Peers are members of organizations (one corresponding
to each role) and have identities, X.509 public key certifi-
cates [57], and sign transactions accordingly. The public
key certificates are issued by the HLF CA, but any organiza-
tion can specify the CA they wish to issue certificates from,
or use another public key infrastructure (PKI) if they wish.
Signatures are checked as part of the transaction process, as
chaincode invocations must be endorsed (signed) by the ap-
propriate parties. In our implementation, these are the peers
invoking the chaincode. Thus, auditors or users can check
the transactions that updated the value of a key and easily
determine the agent responsible for the update, as they will
have endorsed the transaction.
As endorsement policies can require multiple signatures,
they could hold multiple parties accountable e.g., if data
providers were considered responsible for accepting invalid
requests, they could be required to sign the corresponding
request transactions. An ordering service of specific peers
(e.g., auditors) could also be used to detect and flag invalid
requests as they are initially processed (and endorsement
policies are checked) before committing the requests. These
are not present in our implementation, but give an idea of
what may be possible as Hyperledger Fabric undergoes con-
tinued development and implements further cryptographic
tools.
Trillian implementation The second implementation of
the system, summarized in Figure 4, is based on Trillian’s
verifiable log-backed map (introduced in Section 3.2) as its
underlying data structure.
As part of request, agents append signed requests they
have sent to the log, which data providers can then check.
There is no built-in identity system, so the log server service
responsible for receiving new requests must check that they
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are signed. A map server then monitors the log for new en-
tries, and updates the map according to the new entries–the
common identifiers are used as the keys in the map. It then
periodically publishes signed map heads that are written to
the second verifiable log, solely responsible for keeping track
of published signed map heads. To perform check, users can
then query the map to efficiently check their possible com-
mon identifier values. The map will return a Merkle proof
of non-inclusion for common identifiers that do not map to
requests (i.e. the common identifier maps to a zero value),
or a Merkle proof of inclusion of requests that the common
identifiers do map to. Auditors performing audit can in turn
check that the map is operated correctly by replaying all log
entries, verifying that they correspond to the same map heads
that were written to the second verifiable log tracking signed
map heads.
6.2 Trade-offs and performance
Trade-offs We now compare both implementations. Tril-
lian has the advantage of having a higher transaction
throughput, because no consensus is required among differ-
ent nodes to agree on the ordering of transactions. Trillian
also has better user auditability, because when a user queries
the map server for an idc, the map server returns a Merkle
proof of the key and value being included in the map. HLF
does not support this, requiring users to replay the entire
blockchain in order to verify the inclusion of a key and value.
This could be managed if “light clients” were introduced (as
in Ethereum). Users could also decide to outsource this task
to a trusted data broker, or multiple if they believe that a ma-
jority are honest.
HLF supports flexible chaincode policies for governing
write access to the log, as it comes with built-in authenti-
cation and public key infrastructure known as an identity
service. Authenticating must be done separately in Tril-
lian. However, this means that in HLF users must submit
queries to audit the log using a key pair associated with their
pseudonymous identity, so if they used the same identity for
multiple queries, their common identifiers could be linked
together.
The two systems also differ in their decentralised (HLF,
even though it is permissioned) or centralised (Trillian) ap-
proach. A decentralised approach is appealing as it reduces
the trust required in single entities. In practice, however,
there is only one organisation that legitimately has reason
to write records for a particular business relationship. Users
will mostly only have a single data provider for a service,
which may lend itself more towards the centralised approach.
Table 3 summarizes the features of both implementations
Ultimately, Trillian is easier to deploy and has less setup than
Hyperledger, as HLF requires the setup of a network of mul-
tiple nodes to act as peers, and the maintenance of an identity
service to allow nodes to interact with the network.
Table 3: Summary of features for the Hyperledger Fabric and
Trillian based implementations.
Features HLF Trillian
User privacy   
Agent privacy G#  
Data provider privacy G#  
Statistical privacy   
User auditability G#  
External auditability   
Verifiability   
Access control  G#
Table 4: Micro-benchmarks of basic operations for the Hy-
perledger Fabric and Trillian based implementations. The
maximal throughput values are given for a batch size of 1 in
the HLF case, and a batch size of 300 in the Trillian case.
Measures HLF Trillian
State update (per idc) 65ms 35ms
Request retrieval (per idc) 66ms 14ms
Max throughput 40 102
Micro-benchmarks Table 4 presents micro-benchmarks
for basic operations. These include state updates (i.e., adding
a request as part of request), state retrievals (i.e., retriev-
ing requests as part of performing check) and the maximal
throughput for each system with a batch size (i.e., requests
per state update) of one. In the case of state updates and
retrievals, the results were obtained by averaging over 500
operations. In both cases, the average for each operation are
a few dozen milliseconds. Note that for the HLF system, the
results include the time required to create and submit 500
blocks, chaincode execution alone is otherwise under 10ms.
For state retrievals, HLF allows retrieving the values for a
range of keys. This scales linearly with the number of values
retrieved and only requires one transaction.
Throughput Table 4 also includes the maximal through-
put, which is 40 for the HLF system and 102 for the Trillian
system. A plot of throughput for different batch sizes is also
presented in Figure 5.
For the HLF system, the highest throughput is observed
for lower batch sizes, where the bottleneck is simply the
client sending requests. Throughput then lowers slightly as
batch size increases. For the Trillian system, the batch size of
the verifiable derived-map implementation determines how
many items at a time the map servers retrieves from the log
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Figure 5: Throughput evaluation for both implementations.
to update the map’s key-values, until around batch size 300.
The bottleneck is then the number of keys updated by the
map server per second, and throughput levels out.
There are, however, trade-offs to consider between batch
size and throughput. Although a higher throughput that may
be obtained with a larger batch size, having requests appear
on the system sooner than later may be advantageous for
some use cases of our system, and certainly the motivating
examples of law enforcement and healthcare. Thus, a lower
batch size may be advantageous to ensure requests appear as
soon as possible, particularly for urgent requests. A batch
timeout can also be used as a compromise, such that a high
batch size can be chosen with a guarantee that a request will
appear after a time limit if the batch size limit is not reached.
We may also look at the case of law enforcement for indi-
cations, using figures from the 2016 UK IPCO report (neither
in the healthcare setting, nor for the use of US administrative
subpoenas are there equivalent publicly available statistics).
There are about 750000 requests for communication data per
year in the UK [33], or 1 request every 9 seconds assum-
ing requests happen during working hours. In this case, a
HLF-based server capable of 40 requests per second, placed
at the interface for law-enforcement (standardized by ETSI
TS 103 307 [21]) would be more than sufficient, with an av-
erage waiting time of 25 ms assuming Poisson-distributed
requests. For a Trillian-based system with 102 transactions
per second the average waiting time would be 10 ms.
Accuracy of MultiBallot statistics To evaluate the effec-
tiveness and applicability of our scheme, we measure the
accuracy of the rule association metrics computed on Dpriv.
For our experiments, we generate multiple synthetic datasets
with several frequent element sets [30], then mine those
itemsets using the Apriori algorithm [4], which works by
identifying frequent elements in the dataset and extends them
to larger element sets for as long as the element sets appear
frequently enough in the dataset. The generated datasets fol-
low the structure of D (described in Section 5). We then
compute the support and confidence measures on Dpriv for
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Figure 6: Percent error for the support over two elements as
rule occurrences vary in the case 3, 5, 7 and 9Ballot.
the previously extracted element sets, comparing those val-
ues with the reported values for the same element sets on D.
For this purpose, we use the percent error of the measures.
Element sets are commonly extracted both in the inter-
ception use case e.g., proportion of urgent requests, analy-
sis of request rejections, errors and recommendations [33],
and the healthcare use case e.g., proportions of people reg-
istered with diabetes that achieved blood glucose, pressure
and cholesterol targets [46]. We opt to use synthetic datasets
to examine the accuracy offered by our ThreeBallot scheme
more thoroughly, by simulating different scenarios rather
than relying on public datasets that have already been san-
itized. However, we also verify our reported results using
commonly used public datasets, such as the Extended Bak-
ery dataset [15] and the T10I4D100K dataset [24]. In all our
experiments, we measure the error for both the support and
the confidence metrics. We include only the graphs for sup-
port, as those for confidence are identical. Each experiment
is repeated 100 times.
In our first experiment, we study the percent error for the
support over two elements when varying the number of rule
occurrences for a dataset of 1 million records. As seen in
Figure 6, which shows the results in the case of 3, 5, 7 and
9Ballot, element sets that occur less often are prone to higher
percent error, with a high variance in the reported support
values. As element sets become more frequent (up to around
11%), the percent error (< 2%) and the variance both shrink.
The difference in percent error between MultiBallot schemes
also shrinks and for the sake of exposition we highlight only
the results for 3Ballot in our next experiments.
In our second experiment, we examine if the scheme’s ac-
curacy for an element set depends on the number of times the
element set occurs, or its occurrences relative to the overall
number of users (i.e., support). We generate four datasets of
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various size (1k, 10k, 100k, 1M users), and pick five element
sets with support 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 from each dataset.
Figure 7 presents the percent error for those element sets in
every dataset. The percent error shrinks as the support in-
creases, but the absolute size of the element set seems to play
a more decisive role in the accuracy of the statistics. In the
cases of the 100k and 1M user datasets, the support seems to
have a minimal effect on the accuracy. These results are in
accordance with the work of Blum et al. [8, Section 3.1.1].
Our final experiment evaluates the performance of our
ThreeBallot scheme for different element set sizes using a
synthetic dataset of 100k users. As seen in Figure 8, the
scheme’s accuracy is sensitive to increases in the number of
elements. This is expected as the scheme probabilistically
estimates the field values of the original record Ri, based on
the observed share. Understandably, the inference error for
each field adds up with the number of elements.
Based on the above results and the list of statistics re-
ported in the IPCO report [33], our ThreeBallot scheme is
suitable for the law-enforcement use case. To better evaluate
its suitability for healthcare data, we now look into the rel-
evant medical and biostatistics literature. We consider two
types of studies: Studies on Genes and Protein networks,
and Epidemiology studies. In the first type, datasets com-
monly contain between 100,000 and a few million records,
while the support threshold is usually around 0.5%. In most
cases, valid association rules are comprised of only two
elements, while their support is higher than the minimum
threshold. This is important as the minimum threshold is
relevant only during the rule mining phase, while in the veri-
fication phase the users compute measures over the relation-
ships that are reported by the researcher as strongly associ-
ated [23, 28, 36, 44]. In epidemiology studies, the average
element set size is 3, while the minimum support is around
1%. However, the support of relevant element sets identified
is much higher and ranges from 1% to 16%, while datasets
contain between 10,000 and 250,000 records [35, 47, 55].
We conclude that our ThreeBallot scheme is also suitable for
these types of studies, with a slightly higher expected percent
error compared to the law-enforcement use case.
6.3 Deployability
For a system like VAMS to be deployed, agents and data
providers would need to implement the necessary infrastruc-
ture. They may do so voluntarily, so as to increase pub-
lic confidence that their access to personal data is legiti-
mate [53]. Participants may also implement VAMS to allow
them to demonstrate that personal data has not been tam-
pered with when used as evidence, with the transparency
properties just being a desirable side-effect of this activity.
Alternatively, participants may have a statutory obligation
to provide transparency e.g., compliance with ETSI require-
ments may be a condition of providing a telecommunica-
tion service, and their standards do include provision for re-
quiring authenticity and transparency of access to personal
data [21]. In the UK, the IPCO can require that public au-
thorities and telecommunication operators provide the com-
missioner’s office with any assistance required to carry out
audits and this could include implementing IT infrastruc-
ture [1, Section 235(2)]. Another possible route for impos-
ing a statutory requirement to provide transparency could be
through enforcement action by a regulator such the Federal
Trade Commission or a data protection authority.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed and implemented (twice) a system,
VAMS, which achieves our auditability and privacy goals,
based on realistic use cases. Our results illustrate that the
current framework for requesting data can be greatly im-
proved to benefit all parties involved. In particular, VAMS
does not have to replace any existing component in the work-
flow of an organization. Instead, it serves as an overlay that
can be used to achieve transparency and privacy goals.
13
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Jonathan Bootle for the
helpful discussions and suggestions. Alexander Hicks is
supported by OneSpan2 and UCL through an EPSRC Re-
search Studentship, Vasilis Mavroudis is supported by the
European Commission through the H2020-DS-2014-653497
PANORAMIX project, Mustafa Al-Bassam is supported by
a scholarship from The Alan Turing Institute, Sarah Meik-
lejohn is supported in part by EPSRC Grant EP/N028104/1
and in part by a Google Faculty Award, and Steven Mur-
doch is supported by The Royal Society [grant number
UF160505].
References
[1] Investigatory Powers Act, 2016.
[2] ADAM EIJDENBERG, B. L., AND CUTTER, A. Tril-
lian – verifiable data structures, 2017.
[3] AGRAWAL, R., IMIELIN´SKI, T., AND SWAMI, A.
Mining association rules between sets of items in large
databases. In ACM SIGMOD Record (1993), vol. 22,
ACM, pp. 207–216.
[4] AGRAWAL, R., AND SRIKANT, R. Fast algorithms for
mining association rules. Proc. of the 20th VLDB Con-
ference (1994), 487–499.
[5] ALVIM, M. S., ANDRE´S, M. E., CHATZIKOKO-
LAKIS, K., DEGANO, P., AND PALAMIDESSI, C. Dif-
ferential privacy: on the trade-off between utility and
information leakage. In International Workshop on
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (2011), Springer,
pp. 39–54.
[6] ANDROULAKI, E., BARGER, A., BORTNIKOV, V.,
CACHIN, C., CHRISTIDIS, K., DE CARO, A.,
ENYEART, D., FERRIS, C., LAVENTMAN, G.,
MANEVICH, Y., MURALIDHARAN, S., MURTHY, C.,
NGUYEN, B., SETHI, M., SINGH, G., SMITH, K.,
SORNIOTTI, A., STATHAKOPOULOU, C., VUKOLIC´,
M., WEED COCCO, S., AND YELLICK, J. Hyper-
ledger Fabric: A Distributed Operating System for Per-
missioned Blockchains. ArXiv e-prints (Jan. 2018).
[7] BATES, A., BUTLER, K. R., SHERR, M., SHIELDS,
C., TRAYNOR, P., AND WALLACH, D. Accountable
wiretapping–or–i know they can hear you now. Journal
of Computer Security 23, 2 (2015), 167–195.
[8] BLUM, A., DWORK, C., MCSHERRY, F., AND NIS-
SIM, K. Practical privacy: the sulq framework. In Pro-
ceedings of the twenty-fourth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-
2https://www.onespan.com/
SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
(2005), ACM, pp. 128–138.
[9] CACHIN, C. Architecture of the Hyperledger
blockchain fabric. In Workshop on Distributed Cryp-
tocurrencies and Consensus Ledgers (2016).
[10] CAO, J., KARRAS, P., RAI¨SSI, C., AND TAN, K.-L.
ρ-uncertainty: inference-proof transaction anonymiza-
tion. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 3, 1-2
(2010), 1033–1044.
[11] CHASE, M., AND MEIKLEJOHN, S. Transparency
overlays and applications. In ACM CCS 16 (Vienna,
Austria, Oct. 24–28, 2016), E. R. Weippl, S. Katzen-
beisser, C. Kruegel, A. C. Myers, and S. Halevi, Eds.,
ACM Press, pp. 168–179.
[12] CHEN, R., MOHAMMED, N., FUNG, B. C., DESAI,
B. C., AND XIONG, L. Publishing set-valued data via
differential privacy. Proceedings of the VLDB Endow-
ment 4, 11 (2011), 1087–1098.
[13] CROSBY, S. A., AND WALLACH, D. S. Efficient data
structures for tamper-evident logging. In USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (2009), pp. 317–334.
[14] DAGDELEN, O¨. The cryptographic security of the Ger-
man electronic identity card. PhD thesis, Technische
Universita¨t Darmstadt, 2013.
[15] DEKHTYAR, A., AND VERBURG, J. Extended
bakery dataset. https://wiki.csc.calpoly.edu/
datasets/wiki/ExtendedBakery, 2009.
[16] DOMINGO-FERRER, J., AND TORRA, V. A critique of
k-anonymity and some of its enhancements. In Avail-
ability, Reliability and Security, 2008. ARES 08. Third
International Conference on (2008), IEEE, pp. 990–
993.
[17] DOWLING, B., GU¨NTHER, F., HERATH, U., AND
STEBILA, D. Secure logging schemes and certifi-
cate transparency. In ESORICS 2016, Part II (Herak-
lion, Greece, Sept. 26–30, 2016), I. G. Askoxylakis,
S. Ioannidis, S. K. Katsikas, and C. A. Meadows, Eds.,
vol. 9879 of LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, Germany,
pp. 140–158.
[18] DWORK, C. Differential privacy: A survey of re-
sults. In International Conference on Theory and Ap-
plications of Models of Computation (2008), Springer,
pp. 1–19.
[19] DWORK, C., MCSHERRY, F., NISSIM, K., AND
SMITH, A. Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Pri-
vate Data Analysis. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 265–284.
14
[20] DWORK, C., NAOR, M., PITASSI, T., AND ROTH-
BLUM, G. N. Differential privacy under continual ob-
servation. In Proceedings of the forty-second ACM
symposium on Theory of computing (2010), ACM,
pp. 715–724.
[21] ETSI. TS 103 307: Security aspects for LI and RD
interfaces, 2018. V1.3.1.
[22] EVFIMIEVSKI, A., SRIKANT, R., AGRAWAL, R.,
AND GEHRKE, J. Privacy preserving mining of asso-
ciation rules. Information Systems 29, 4 (2004), 343–
364.
[23] FARIA, D., SCHLICKER, A., PESQUITA, C., BAS-
TOS, H., FERREIRA, A. E., ALBRECHT, M., AND
FALCA˜O, A. O. Mining go annotations for improving
annotation consistency. PloS one 7, 7 (2012), e40519.
[24] FLOUVAT, F., DE MARCH, F., AND PETIT, J.-M. A
thorough experimental study of datasets for frequent
itemsets. In Data Mining, Fifth IEEE International
Conference on (2005), IEEE.
[25] FRANKLE, J., PARK, S., SHAAR, D., GOLDWASSER,
S., AND WEITZNER, D. J. Practical accountability
of secret processes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2018/697, 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/
697.
[26] GOLDWASSER, S., AND PARK, S. Public accountabil-
ity vs. secret laws: Can they coexist?: A cryptographic
proposal. In Proceedings of the 2017 on Workshop on
Privacy in the Electronic Society (2017), ACM, pp. 99–
110.
[27] GOOGLE. Trillian, 2017.
[28] GUZZI, P. H., MILANO, M., AND CANNATARO, M.
Mining association rules from gene ontology and pro-
tein networks: Promises and challenges. Procedia
Computer Science 29 (2014), 1970–1980.
[29] HAEBERLEN, A., PIERCE, B. C., AND NARAYAN, A.
Differential privacy under fire. In 20th USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium, San Francisco, CA, USA, August 8-12,
2011, Proceedings (2011).
[30] HEATON, J. Comparing dataset characteristics that fa-
vor the apriori, eclat or fp-growth frequent itemset min-
ing algorithms. In SoutheastCon 2016 (March 2016),
pp. 1–7.
[31] HENRY, K., STINSON, D. R., AND SUI, J. The effec-
tiveness of receipt-based attacks on ThreeBallot. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 4,
4 (2009), 699–707.
[32] HOME OFFICE. Operational case for the use of
communications data by public authorities. https:
//www.gov.uk/government/publications/
investigatory-powers-bill-overarching-documents,
2016.
[33] INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SIONER’S OFFICE. Report of the interception of com-
munications commissioner - annual report for 2016,
December 2017.
[34] INVESTIGATORY POWERS COMMITIONER’S OFFICE.
Annual report of the investigatory powers commis-
sioner 2017, January 2019.
[35] JENSEN, P. B., JENSEN, L. J., AND BRUNAK, S. Min-
ing electronic health records: towards better research
applications and clinical care. Nature Reviews Genet-
ics 13, 6 (2012), 395.
[36] KUMAR, A., SMITH, B., AND BORGELT, C. De-
pendence relationships between gene ontology terms
based on tigr gene product annotations. In Proceed-
ings of CompuTerm 2004: 3rd International Workshop
on Computational Terminology (2004).
[37] LAURIE, B., AND KASPER, E. Revocation trans-
parency. Google Research, September (2012).
[38] LAURIE, B., LANGLEY, A., AND KASPER, E. Rfc
6962 – Certificate transparency. Tech. rep., 2013.
[39] LEE, J., AND CLIFTON, C. How much is enough?
choosing ε for differential privacy. In International
Conference on Information Security (2011), Springer,
pp. 325–340.
[40] LI, N., LI, T., AND VENKATASUBRAMANIAN, S. t-
closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity.
In Data Engineering, 2007. ICDE 2007. IEEE 23rd In-
ternational Conference on (2007), IEEE, pp. 106–115.
[41] MACHANAVAJJHALA, A., GEHRKE, J., KIFER, D.,
AND VENKITASUBRAMANIAM, M. l-diversity: Pri-
vacy beyond k-anonymity. In Data Engineering, 2006.
ICDE’06. Proceedings of the 22nd International Con-
ference on (2006), IEEE.
[42] MELARA, M. S., BLANKSTEIN, A., BONNEAU, J.,
FELTEN, E. W., AND FREEDMAN, M. J. Coniks:
Bringing key transparency to end users. In USENIX
Security Symposium (2015), vol. 2015, pp. 383–398.
[43] MORIARTY, K., KALISKI, B., AND RUSCH, A. Pkcs#
5: Password-based cryptography specification version
2.1.
15
[44] NAGAR, A., HAHSLER, M., AND AL-MUBAID, H.
Association rule mining of gene ontology annotation
terms for sgd. In Computational Intelligence in Bioin-
formatics and Computational Biology (CIBCB), 2015
IEEE Conference on (2015), IEEE, pp. 1–7.
[45] NARAYAN, A., FELDMAN, A., PAPADIMITRIOU, A.,
AND HAEBERLEN, A. Verifiable differential privacy.
In Proceedings of the Tenth European Conference on
Computer Systems (2015), ACM, p. 28.
[46] (NHS), N. H. S. National diabetes audit report, 2017.
[47] PARK, S. H., JANG, S. Y., KIM, H., AND LEE, S. W.
An association rule mining-based framework for under-
standing lifestyle risk behaviors. PloS one 9, 2 (2014),
e88859.
[48] QUINLAN, J. R. Induction of decision trees. Machine
learning 1, 1 (1986), 81–106.
[49] QUINLAN, J. R. C4. 5: programs for machine learn-
ing. Elsevier, 2014.
[50] RIVEST, R. L. The ThreeBallot voting system.
[51] RIVEST, R. L., AND SMITH, W. D. Three
voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin.
USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology
(EVT 2007) (2007).
[52] STRAUSS, C. E. A critical review of the
triple ballot voting system, part 2: Cracking
the triple ballot encryption. Unpublished draft,
http: // cems. browndogs. org/ pub/ voting/
tripletrouble. pdf 74 (2006).
[53] SULEYMAN, M., AND LAURIE, B. Trust, confidence
and verifiable data audit, 2017.
[54] SWEENEY, L. k-anonymity: A model for protecting
privacy. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzzi-
ness and Knowledge-Based Systems 10, 05 (2002),
557–570.
[55] TOTI, G., VILALTA, R., LINDNER, P., LEFER, B.,
MACIAS, C., AND PRICE, D. Analysis of correlation
between pediatric asthma exacerbation and exposure to
pollutant mixtures with association rule mining. Artifi-
cial intelligence in medicine 74 (2016), 44–52.
[56] VUKOLIC´, M. Rethinking permissioned blockchains.
In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Blockchain,
Cryptocurrencies and Contracts (2017), ACM, pp. 3–
7.
[57] YEE, P. Updates to the internet x. 509 public key
infrastructure certificate and certificate revocation list
(CRL) profile.
[58] ZHANG, N., WANG, S., AND ZHAO, W. A new
scheme on privacy preserving association rule mining.
In European Conference on Principles of Data Mining
and Knowledge Discovery (2004), Springer, pp. 484–
495.
A MultiBallots
In this appendix, we present an extension of the ThreeBallot
scheme to allow for any odd number n = 2k+ 1 of shares,
which we call MultiBallot. The goal of this appendix is to
provide more details about the security of the scheme as ar-
gued in Section 5, following Henry et al. [31]. We follow the
terminology used in Section 5 for consistency i.e., a ballot
of 2k+ 1 shares is generated from a record, rather than the
voting related terminology found in most of the work related
to ThreeBallot. We also restrict our analysis to the setting of
binary elements.
We start off with the case of an adversary that knows sev-
eral shares of a ballot that tries to reconstruct the record by
determining the missing shares. Each element of a share can
appear in four forms, 42, 24, 44 or 22. For the sake of
presentation, we will for now consider only ballots for one
element, so a share simply corresponds to an element. It is
easy to see that a ballot must contain the same number of44
and 22 elements (which we call doubles), and a number of24 and 42 elements (which we call singles) that differ by
1. As ballots that count for either value (24 or 42) of the
element are symmetric since it suffices to flip the single el-
ements, there will be as many 24 and 42 shares over all
possible ballots.
We now determine the form of the possible valid ballots,
taking into account the fact that in a valid ballot the element’s
value in the record must appear k+1 times, while its inverse
must appear k times. The doubles even themselves out, while
the singles make the difference, so there can only be up to 2k
doubles in a ballot (i.e., k of each), and there must be a least
one single to determine the original value of the element. As
there can be no doubles, the number of singles then ranges
from 1 to k+1 for the single representing the original value
of the element, and from 0 to k for the other. A simple way
of iterating over the possible forms of a ballot is then to take
an index i ∈ [1,k+1] that counts the number of singles cor-
responding to the original value of the element in the record.
There are then i−1 of the other single, as well as k+1− i of
each double.
To obtain all possible ballots, it is simply necessary to
compute the number of permutations for each form a bal-
lot can take. To take into account the repetition of shares in
the ballot (e.g., multiple24 shares), we use the standard for-
mula for multiset permutations. Given a ballot with i singles
of the original value of the element, the number of permuta-
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tions of this ballot is as follows.
(2k+1)!
i!(i−1)!(k+1− i)!(k+1− i)! (A.1)
Computing the total number of possible valid ballots V is
then only a matter of summing over all possible forms of
ballots i.e., summing over i from 1 to k+1, and multiplying
the result by a factor of two as elements can take two values.
This can also be computed simply as 2
(2k+1
k+1
)(2k+1
k
)
, but we
proceed using the sum form in the next steps.
V = 2
k+1
∑
i=1
(2k+1)!
i!(i−1)!(k+1− i)!(k+1− i)! (A.2)
We can now compute the probability distribution of shares by
counting the number of times they appear in the valid ballots
i.e., in the (2k+1) ·V shares of valid ballots. This amounts
to again taking the sum of permutations of ballots, but we
multiply these by the number of times the share appears in
the ballot. As the doubles appear in the same count for bal-
lots corresponding to both values of the element, we multiply
the result by a factor of two to account. For the singles, they
appear in different counts depending on the value of the el-
ement in the record, so we sum both cases. We denote the
number of 42, 24, 44 or 22 shares by V42, V24, V44
or V22.
V42 =V24 = k+1∑
i=1
(2i−1) (2k+1)!
i!(i−1)!(k+1− i)!(k+1− i)!
(A.3)
V44=V22= 2 k+1∑
i=1
(k+1−i) (2k+1)!
i!(i−1)!(k+1− i)!(k+1− i)!
(A.4)
The probabilities for each share are then as follows.
Pr(42) = Pr(24) = V42
(2k+1)V
(A.5)
Pr(44) = Pr(22) = V44
(2k+1)V
(A.6)
With this, we can compute the probability Pvalid that ran-
domly chosen shares will form a valid ballot by simply sum-
ming over the possible ballots, weighted by the probability of
each share. In the case where shares contain more than one
element, the probability in the case of a number of elements
e in the share is simply Pe.
P = 2
k+1
∑
i=1
(2k+1)!
i!(i−1)!(k+1− i)!(k+1− i)!
Pr(42)i Pr(24)i−1 Pr(44)k+1−i Pr(22)k+1−i
(A.7)
Finally, we can compute the probability of an adversary suc-
cessfully reconstructing a ballot. As the adversary knows
up to a ∈ [1,2k] shares of the ballot, they can attempt to re-
construct the user’s ballot from this by choosing 2k+ 1− a
other shares from the dataset, which gives
((2k+1)r−a
2k+1−a
)
pos-
sibilities, where r is the number of records, from which we
subtract 1 as there must be at least one valid ballot. Thus for
e elements per record, the adversary’s chance of success S is
given as the probability of finding a valid ballot amongst the
possible choices of shares they can make.
S = (1−Pe)((2k+1)r−a2k+1−a )−1 (A.8)
This can easily be computed, and the code we have used to
do so will be available upon publication, although dealing
with float underflows makes it difficult to compute bounds
for higher values of r and e.
B Association Rule Mining
Association rule mining [3] is one of the most commonly
used approaches to identify if-then rules and relationships
between variables in large datasets (e.g., healthcare data).
Given an element set E = {e1,e2, . . .} of binary elements of
a record and a dataset D = {R1,R2, . . .} of records contain-
ing elements that form a subset of E, a rule is an implication
ε ⇒ ε ′ where ε,ε ′ ⊆ E. Such association rules are used to
find interesting relationships between variables, like linking
a set of genes with a particular disease. Two measures are
commonly used to select interesting rules: support and con-
fidence.
Support (defined in equation B.1) indicates how fre-
quently a subset of elements appears in the dataset i.e., the
proportion of records R ∈ δ , where δ ⊆ D, that contain a
subset of elements ε ∈ E.
supp(ε) =
|{R ∈ δ : ε ∈ R}|
|δ | (B.1)
The support of a rule ε ⇒ ε ′, is simply the support of the
joint element sets i.e., supp(ε ⇒ ε ′) = supp(ε ∪ ε ′). From
the above, we can also compute confidence (defined in equa-
tion B.2) to indicate how often a rule is found to be true.
Given a rule ε⇒ ε ′, as above, it is straightforwardly defined
from the support of the rule ε ⇒ ε ′ over the support of an-
tecedent ε .
con f (ε ⇒ ε ′) = supp(ε ⇒ ε
′)
supp(ε)
(B.2)
Computing these values on D is straightforward but some
pre-processing is needed to extract them from Dpriv, which
contains elements e, so not all of the observed values for ε
and ε ′ match those of the original record.
Our goal is to estimate the true counts of ε , ε ′ and ε∪ε ′ in
D, based on observations from Dpriv. Computing the support
and confidence measures defined above is then straightfor-
ward. This process is often referred to as support recovery in
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the literature. For simplicity, we represent both the original
records and the shares as bitstrings e.g., a record with five
elements, all being true, will be represented as [1,1,1,1,1]
in binary representation, or as 31 in decimal representation.
We also define a vector oD that contains the occurrences of
all possible bitstring permutations in D, and a vector opriv
with all bitstring occurrences for Dpriv.
oD, opriv =
 #[0]...
#[2t −1]
 (B.3)
We also compute the expected bitstring occurrences in
Dpriv, denoted E(#bitstring), for all possible bitstring per-
mutations and a fixed number of bits (i.e., elements) t, and
store these values in a matrix M.
M =
 E[#[0]]0 . . . E(#[0])2t−1... ... ...
E[#[2t −1]]0 . . . E(#[2t −1])2t−1
 (B.4)
We can then estimate opriv from the product of M and oD
by computing opriv.
opriv = M ·oD (B.5)
In our case, opriv is obtained from Dpriv and it is oD that we
are interested in. We can solve the previous equation for oD
by inverting3 M and multiplying it with opriv, giving us the
following expression for oD.
oD ≈M−1 ·opriv (B.6)
Based on the inferred value of oD, we can now compute
the support and confidence measures for any element sets ε ,
ε ′. The accuracy of this method is evaluated in Section 6.
It should be noted that as Dpriv is used only for verifica-
tion of the reported statistics and not for mining new asso-
ciations, this leaves plenty of room for minimizing the in-
formation content of Dpriv. In particular, if D is composed
of records with a large number of elements, but only few
of these have interesting correlations that are relevant in the
published statistics, then only these need to be included in
Dpriv. This can significantly reduce the size of Dpriv com-
pared to D, especially in cases of datasets sparse in relation-
ships. Moreover, our technique can in certain cases support
statistics involving continuous variables. For example, while
during the rule mining phase the researcher may need to ex-
amine the exact blood pressure values (e.g.., 0–250mm Hg),
once a relevant blood pressure threshold is identified, all the
values can be expressed as larger or smaller to that threshold
(e.g., “blood pressure over 180”). This practice is common
3M is a square nonsingular matrix as long as its determinant is non-zero.
Singular matrices are considered to be rare, and can be made nonsingular
with very slight changes that would not affect the results much in our case.
in machine learning algorithms. For example, C4.5 (an ex-
tension of ID3 [48]) builds decision trees from sets of data
samples containing both continuous and discrete attributes.
For those that are continuous, it defines a threshold that max-
imizes the information gain and then splits the samples to
those with attibute value lower than the threshold and those
with equal or larger value [49]. Alternatively, continuous
variables can be discretized and split into multiple binary el-
ements.
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